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ABSTRACT
This paper explores recent trends in the size of scientific teams and in institutional collaborations.
The data derive from 2.4 million scientific papers written in 110 leading U.S. research universities
over the period 1981-1999. We measure team size by the number of authors on a scientific paper.
Using this measure we find that team size increases by 50 percent over the 19-year period. We
supplement team size with measures of domestic and foreign institutional collaborations, which
capture the geographic dispersion of team workers. The time series evidence suggests that the trend
towards larger and more dispersed teams accelerates at the start of the 1990s. This acceleration
suggests a sudden decline in the cost of collaboration, perhaps due to improvements in
telecommunications. Using a panel of top university departments we find that private universities
and departments whose scientists have earned prestigious awards participate in larger teams, as do
departments that have larger amounts of federal funding. Placement of former graduate students is
a key determinant of institutional collaborations, especially collaborations with firms and foreign
scientific institutions. Finally, the evidence indicates that scientific influence increases with team
size and institutional collaborations. Since increasing team size implies an increase in the division
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I.  Introduction   
 
Over the past century teams of scientific specialists have largely replaced the independent scientist, 
much as corporate R&D laboratories have largely replaced the independent inventor.  This trend towards 
larger teams is strongly evident in nearly all data on scientific research, including our own
1.  Advancing 
instrumentation and the sheer quantity of what there is to know have pushed it, while improving 
communications have pulled it, to its present state of development.  Pencil-and-paper research is the lone 
exception to the rule, but this forms a dwindling share of science and may at last succumb to the same 
forces that have elsewhere led to large-scale research. 
The study of scientific teams is important, first, because it brings to light changes in the research 
production function that otherwise would remain hidden.  In particular, scientific collaboration might 
increase the effectiveness of research, just as specialization increases general productive efficiency
2.  The 
evidence on efficiency is suggestive but not definitive.  Collaborative research is more highly cited 
(Presser, 1980; Sauer, 1988), suggesting that collaboration does raise quality.  But more able researchers 
also attract more coworkers (Zuckerman and Merton, 1973) so that separating efficiency from talent in a 
cross-section is not easy.  Still, the size of scientific teams has increased steadily with time, so that growth 
in capital, knowledge, and communications could be responsible for the rising propensity to collaborate 
even as talent has remained about the same. 
A second reason why collaboration is important lies in its role as a channel of knowledge flows 
between scientists.  And since collaborators are increasingly found in different institutions and countries, 
the entire subject is relevant to the tendency for knowledge to flow more readily and over greater distances 
than ever before. 
In this paper we present findings on the size of scientific teams, institutional collaborations, and the 
geographic dispersion of team workers, using a large database that covers most of U.S. academic science 
                                                 
1 See Zuckerman and Merton (1973), De Solla Price (1986), and Hicks and Katz (1996), for trends in the 
size of scientific teams since 1900.  Weiner (1994), writing about mid-century, strongly disapproves of the 
notion that corporate R&D laboratories might supplant individual researchers and inventors.  And yet 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1998, Ch. 2) describes exactly this process of replacement.  
2 The form of the research production function is central to the properties of growth models, as a 
comparison between Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) reveals.  Thus the findings of this paper could prove 
indirectly relevant to growth theory.  
  
during the years 1981-1999.  Our analysis begins with the description of trends in scientific teams and 
collaborations at the level of individual scientific papers, which are observations at the piece-work level.  
Afterwards, in the context of a panel of universities and fields observed over time, we examine the 
determinants of team size and institutional collaboration, as well as their consequences for research output. 
The descriptive findings include the following.  The data confirm that team size has increased by about 
50 percent during the last two decades of the 20
th century.  We also find that the trend towards larger teams 
accelerated, rising from a 2.19 percent annual rate of growth in the 1980s to a 2.57 percent rate during the 
1990s.  This is an acceleration of 17 percent (2.57/2.19 – 1) between the 1980s and the 1990s.   We also 
study geographic dispersion directly, using a mileage indicator for the top 110 U.S. universities that form 
the core of our data.  The annual rate of growth in mileage rises from 3.53 percent in the 1980s to 4.45 
percent in the 1990s, an acceleration of 29 percent.  
During the same period of time the rate of domestic collaboration more than doubled between U.S. 
universities, and between U.S. universities and U.S. firms. Foreign collaborations, while not as common, 
increased five-fold.  Of all regions, collaboration with Asia increased most rapidly, followed by Europe, 
with other regions trailing by a considerable margin. These differences reflect differences in the growth of 
scientific research by region of the world.  Also, foreign collaboration accelerated between the 1980s and 
1990s. The foreign share in institutional collaborations rose annually by 5.11 percent during the 1980s, but 
by 7.41 percent during the 1990s.  Thus, growth accelerates by 45 percent (7.41/5.11 – 1).   
In additional work we address factors that promote or deter teams and collaborations.  This analysis is 
carried out using a panel of 12 main sciences in the top 110 U.S. universities.  Hence, the observations are 
at the level of university-fields over time.  Our results include the following: a larger stock of federally 
funded R&D, private control of a university, and the number of prestigious awards increase team size.  
Collaboration with other U.S. universities is an increasing function of the stock of R&D, private control, 
and the number of recent PhDs placed in other top 110 schools.  Collaboration with foreign institutions of 
science is found to increase with the stock of R&D, private control, the number of prestigious awards, and 
with the number of recent PhDs placed in leading research countries.  Here the results are more fragile, and 
there is evidence that the stock of R&D and private control trade places with the number of prestigious 
awards. In addition we examine collaboration with U.S. firms, finding again that R&D and private control 
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to an extent increase joint scientific research with firms.  But in this case, prestigious awards decrease 
collaboration with firms, probably because the emphasis of universities earning such awards is on basic 
rather than applied research.  As with foreign collaboration, placement of recent PhDs with industries 
proves to be very powerful in determining collaboration between universities and firms.  The greater 
importance of PhD placements in the case of foreign and corporate collaborations than in university 
collaborations is consistent with the greater scarcity of substitutes for former PhDs in foreign and corporate 
environments.  
The empirical work concludes with a study of the role of team size and collaboration in the 
determination of research output as measured by papers and citations.  The papers and citations are 
“fractionated,” in that they consist of estimated proportions that a university and field contribute to both. 
We find that papers and especially citations increase with team size, but that the role of shares of 
institutional affiliations in the production of papers is less clear.  Universities that collaborate more with 
foreign institutions, and especially other top 110 schools, produce fewer papers, holding team size constant.  
On the other hand collaboration with foreign institutions and other top 110 schools is linked to an increase 
in total citations, so that a trade off of fewer papers in return for larger overall scientific influence appears 
to be taking place.             
The rest of this paper consists of six sections.  Section II reviews the literature and models the 
determinants of scientific teams and institutional collaborations.  Section III describes the database and 
calculations that we have undertaken using it.  Section IV presents time series evidence on scientific teams.  
Section V compares trends in collaborative behavior across scientific disciplines.  Section VI provides 
regression evidence on the determinants of team size and institutional collaboration using a panel of 
university-fields.  Section VII concludes. 
II.  Analytical Framework   
The economics literature on teams is both theoretical and empirical.  One line of theoretical work 
examines the problem of free-riding and proposes incentive schemes that punish shirking (Holmstrom, 
1982; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  Other research examines the relationship between specialization, team 
size, and the extent of the market (Becker, 1985; Becker and Murphy, 1992), while still more research 
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(Rosen, 1982) looks at the role of managerial talent in determining the size of firm and its work force using 
an efficient supervision model. 
Recent empirical research on teams in steel mills by Ichniowski, Shaw and Pennushi (1997) finds that 
innovative management practices that promote cooperation in teams and offer pay incentives increase 
productivity in steel mini-mills over traditional management practices that tend to limit worker 
responsibility.  Other empirical research examines institutional collaborations in science and technology 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Mowery, 1992; Powell, 1996; Stephan and Levin, 2000; Zucker, Darby, 
and Armstrong, 2001; Adams, Chiang and Starkey, 2001; Adams, 2002; Adams, Chiang, and Jensen, 2003; 
Adams, 2003, forthcoming; and Adams and Marcu, 2004).  These papers tend to find that institutional 
collaboration is related to the complementarity of skills, often abetted by policy and by the increasing 
complexity of scientific problems.  
The present paper concerns small teams of co-workers in scientific research.  However, owing to the 
location of team members in different scientific institutions, the paper is concerned as well with 
institutional collaborations.  In our analysis we abstract from free-riding and supervision because the 
system of reward for priority in discovery severely punishes shirking by team members and rewards good 
work with publication, reputation, and income.  Our analysis is inextricably connected, though, with 
specialization, the division of labor, and the location of team members, because these factors play large 
roles in the empirical analysis and influence the efficiency of scientific research. 
In the following exposition we assume that scientific research yields satisfaction to investigators, but 
we suppose that this gain in utility is insufficient for investigators to self-finance their research.  We base 
this assumption on the rarity of scientific research in societies that lack government or private support for 
science.  But if self-finance is ruled out, then it follows that the quantity of research is subject to a research 
budget constraint that is externally imposed, though the budget is of course responsive to grant-raising 
efforts
3.   In conformity with the empirical work below, and with the perception that skill, specialization, 
and the division of labor are inter-related and essential elements in the formation of scientific teams, we 
assume that the decision variables are the skill of team workers , the size of the team , and distance, or  s n
                                                 
3 In the analysis we assume that the research budgetR  is at a maximum with respect to grant-raising 
efforts.  
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geographic dispersionD
4.  Geographic dispersion exceeds zero if and only if the team involves 
institutional collaboration so that  is an indicator of such collaboration.    D
   Research output   is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function of skill and team 
size.  Therefore, 
Q
 (1)     , 
β αn As Q =
The exponents obey the inequalities 1   , 1 0    , 1 0 < + < < < < β α β α  so that production is subject to 
decreasing returns to scale.  The parameter A  represents total factor productivity.  It could represent the 
university environment and the ability or eminence of faculties that are matched to these environments in 
advance of the formation of scientific teams.   A  also undergoes independent increases as knowledge 
expands, because knowledge is a factor of production that is fixed with respect to individual researchers.  In 
turn  A  tends to increase skill and team size.  Thus, “complexity” of projects can be viewed as an indicator 
for knowledge and other sources of total factor productivity of the knowledge production function that give 
larger teams an increasing advantage.  It has been suggested to us that sociological “norms” of scientific 
fields have changed in favor of larger teams.  However, another interpretation is that larger and higher-
skilled teams are more efficient as knowledge increases, so that norms are simply a reflection of efficiency 
rather than an independent causal factor that increases the division of scientific labor. And besides all the 
above, the increasing emphasis by funding agencies on team awards involving large grants and multiple 
scientific institutions is consistent with the advantages of larger teams as driven by A  in this framework. 
On the cost side we assume that the research budgetR  must cover wage costs of all team 
members, as well as a fixed costF  that depends on dispersion of team workers, representing coordination 
costs.  Of course, geographic dispersion entails benefits as well as costs.  In part the gain derives from the 
additional funding that can be secured, as the evidence presented below on international and firm-university 
collaboration suggests.  This is the productive role of dispersion in the present analysis. The research 
budget constraint is: 
                                                 
4 We abstract from the idea that skill and distance could be inter-related as in ( ) 0 s   0, s    , < ′ ′ > ′ = D s s .  This 
constraint would be relevant if abilities were noticeably scarce within a given distance. The analysis in the 
paper could easily be extended to deal with this complicating factor. 
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(2)       () ( ) () D F n s w D R + =  
The amount of funding is a concave function of distance, so that 
(3)     ,  0 , 0 < ′ ′ > ′ R R
Thus the returns to dispersion are diminishing.  Below we allow for both a shift in funding and also of the 
sensitivity of funding to distance or dispersion, which are plausible elements that could alter institutional 
collaborations.  For example, funding could increase as a result of prior awards.  In addition an increase in 
the urban density of universities would tend to increase the sensitivity of funding to distance.  In (2) the 
wage rate  is an increasing and convex function of skill, as in the phenomenon of “superstars” (Rosen, 
1981).  This yields the following properties of the wage function: 
w
(4)     .  0   , 0 > ′ ′ > ′ w w
We suppose that the fixed costF , which represents coordination costs, is an increasing function of 
distance  owing to the difficulty of meeting and communicating which this imposes.  Therefore, the 
properties of the fixed cost function are  
D
(5)     .  0   , 0 > ′ ′ > ′ F F
Thus, coordination costs are an increasing function of distance.  As in the case of fundingR , changes in 
the fixed costs of scientific teams are plausible and realistic features of cross-sectional and time series data.  
Fixed costs and their sensitivity to geographic dispersion tend to decline over time with improvements in 
telecommunications.  F  tends to decrease with prior investments in team workers, especially graduate 
students, which make working at a distance less costly.  This is likely to be a potent factor in both cross-
sectional data, where universities with larger, more highly ranked graduate programs are more prone to 
engage in institutional collaborations; and in time series data, due to the growth of graduate programs over 
time. 
  The problem is one of maximizing output (1) subject to the research budget constraint (2) and their 
properties as expressed in (3)-(5), where the control variables are skill , team size , and distance .  
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
s n D
(6)     () ( ) ( ) [] D F n s w D R n As L − − + =   λ
β α  
First order conditions for (6) are 
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Optimal amounts of skill and team size are assumed to exceed zero, so that the first two expressions are 
equalities. The third expression of (7) is for the moment left as an inequality, to suggest that if funding is 
sufficiently unresponsive to dispersion, then  equals zero and institutional collaboration does not occur.    D
However, consider the case where , so that variations in all three of the controls are allowed.  The 
second order conditions that ensure a maximum for this problem are that the determinants of the bordered 
Hessian of the Lagrangian alternate in sign:  
0 > D





























For exceptionally clear statements of these conditions see Chiang (1974, Section 12.3) or Dixit (1990, 
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Solving (9) for changes in the control variables and pre-multiplying by the transposed shift vector yields 
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Since by (8) [  and  are negative definite, the expression on the right of (10) is strictly negative and 
a combination of   and n  increases as 
] H []
1 − H
s A  increases.  Likewise we can show that an increase in sensitivity 
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of funding to distance , or a decrease in sensitivity of fixed costs D F  causes an increase in  and in 
institutional collaborations.  Finally, an exogenous increase in funding
D
R , perhaps due to past awards, will 
tend to increase team size and skill.  These implications tend to fit rather well the results that we report in 
section VI below.        
III.  Database of Scientific Papers  
 
The data set consists of 2.4 million scientific papers that were published during 1981-1999 and have at 
least one author from a set of leading U.S. universities.  These “top 110” universities account for most of 
U.S. academic research.  The Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) in Philadelphia is the source of the 
data.  All papers belong to a standard set of communications consisting of articles, reviews, notes, and 
proceedings.   The specific source is ISI’s Current Contents data base
5. 
  The papers are assigned to fields according to a classification of the journal in which they appear.  
This classification system consists of 88 academic fields.  In order to link the paper data to the 12 main 
sciences in the National Science Foundation (NSF) CASPAR database, we assign each of the 88 fields to 
one of the 12 main fields
6.   The Appendix lists the 110 universities, ranked by their R&D funding in 1998.  
Table 1 shows the 12 main NSF sciences and their components made up of the 88 ISI sub-fields.  
As noted in the introduction, we use the data both at the paper level and at the level of university-
fields.  At the paper level we compile time trends and cross-sectional patterns by field and year.  The data 
record date of publication, scientific fields of journals in which the papers appear, institutional affiliation of 
authors, address information on city, state, and country; and author names as well as number of authors
7.  
It is important for the reader to see that the address information is completely separate from author 
information, so that a name cannot be assigned to a location at this time. The address information is 
nevertheless useful in its own right.  Besides the top 110 universities the addresses identify U.S. and 
                                                 
5 The journal set consists of approximately 5500 journals that were active in 1999, as well as about 1600 
inactive journals that were cited in currently active periodicals.  
6 The 12 fields are: agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth sciences, 
economics and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, and psychology.   
7 There is no limit at this time on the number of authors in the ISI data.  The maximum number in our 
sample is 210, while the mean number in the paper-level data is 2.36.  Notice that the number of authors 
underestimates the number of team members when it excludes contributors, such as research assistants. It is 
an overestimate when it includes honorific authors.  In short, the number of authors measures the size of 
scientific teams with error.  This error is unavoidable since we lack any other measure of team size.     
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foreign institutions consisting of other universities and colleges; governments and government research 
institutes; medical centers; corporations; and all other institutions
8.  We use the addresses to construct 
fractions of scientific papers written in one or more of the top 110
9.   
We also construct numbers and shares of institutional addresses contributed by different types of 
institutions as rough estimates of the location of team workers.  Within the U.S. the institutional types 
consist of (a) U.S. Government, (b) Other U.S. Universities, (c) U.S. Corporations, (d) U.S. Medical 
Centers, and (e) All Other U.S. Institutions.  Outside the U.S. the institutional types consist of (a) Foreign 
Governments, (b) Foreign Universities, and (c) All Other Foreign Institutions, including by country.  As we 
have seen, this information allows us to assign fractions of papers to different institutional classes as well 
as to provide indicators of the proportional contribution by each class.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of scientific papers by the 12 main science fields.  The table includes 
the years 1981, 1990, and 1999 and all years, showing which fields gain share and which lose.  Among the 
life sciences, which dominate the data, biology gains while agriculture loses.  Among the physical sciences 
astronomy and physics gain share.   Perhaps not surprisingly, among the mathematical sciences, computer 
science gains share and mathematics and statistics lose share. Engineering increases its share. And finally,  
the social and behavioral sciences perceptibly lose share.  
We use paper-level statistics for the descriptive work in sections IV and V, because this retains the 
means and standard deviations of the original data.  In section VI we carry out regression analysis of the 
determinants of team size, domestic and foreign collaboration, and research “output”.   For this purpose we 
construct a panel at the level of universities, fields and years.  The reason is that the panel allows us to 
combine the ISI papers and citations data with information on university-field level R&D and 
characteristics of doctoral programs.  The NSF CASPAR database of universities, a compendium of NSF 
surveys, is the source of the data on university R&D.  The National Research Council 1993 Survey of 
Doctoral Programs (NRC, 1995) includes characteristics of graduate programs, especially counts of Nobel 
                                                 
8 About 5% of the addresses could not be assigned. 
9 The fractions are ½, ½ in the case of two institutions, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 for three institutions, and so on.  The 
cumulative distribution of the number of top 110 institutions per paper is as follows, with number of 
institutions in parentheses:  79.6% (1 institution), 96.8% (2 institutions or less), 98.3% (3 institutions or 
less), and 99.5% (4 institutions or less).  Of course, these are extremely crude indicators of contributions 
because they do not include time and effort by team members, nor do they differentiate among types of 
effort.  In short, the institutional address fractions do not measure labor input, even though we use them to 
attribute output to scientific institutions. 
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prizes and other prestigious awards, as well as rankings of quality of PhD programs in 1993.  Finally, 
microdata from the NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) provide us with estimates of the migration of 
PhD students to the academic and industrial sectors of the U.S. economy, as well as to other countries
10. 
We impose one other constraint on the panel which does not apply to the paper-level data. We consider 
only leading departments out of the top 110.  All other schools form a remainder cell within each field.  
More precisely, we include the top 25 universities in astronomy plus a remainder, the top 50 universities in 
agriculture, chemistry, computer science, economics and business, earth sciences, mathematics and 
statistics, physics, and psychology, plus one remainder each.  And finally we include the top 75 universities 
in biology, medicine, and engineering plus remainders for each of these three fields.  Summing across 
fields, and accounting for the fact that only 48 schools of agriculture formally exist, the panel data consist 
of 660 university-fields in any given year.  Our purpose in breaking out fewer individual schools in smaller 
fields, and more in larger fields, is to avoid large numbers of empty cells for universities in which fields 
(and doctoral programs) are small or non-existent
11.   The result is a panel of 12,540 observations, before 
bad or missing data are excluded, that approximates teams and institutional collaborations of 660 
university-fields in 12 main sciences over the 19-year period. This panel includes an array of variables that 
are likely to drive teams, collaborations, and research output.  We describe the major variables in the panel 
data and sources of these variables in section VI, where we consider determinants of team size and 
collaboration. 
IV.  Time Trends in Scientific Collaborations 
Figures 1-10 display time series of scientific research, team size, and institutional collaboration.  All 
the graphs refer to the years 1981 to 1999.   Figure 1 shows trends in the output of U.S. scientific papers.  
The upper line is the sum of all papers having at least one author from a top 110 U.S. university.  The 
middle line consists of U.S. equivalent papers.  By this we mean the fraction of U.S. affiliations in all 
                                                 
10 The migration data used in this paper represents flows of new PhDs with definite plans at the time of 
graduation, so that the destinations that we used are projected as within a few months of graduation.  The 
data are undercounts since one-third of new PhDs do not have definite plans.  Moreover, the data represent 
even a greater undercount to industry, since many new PhDs go to industry only after completing their 
postdoctoral training. 
11 The size of the remainder of the top 110 equals an average “department” along the individual top 25, 50, 
or 75 schools in a field, showing that we miss rather little by our aggregation procedure.  This finding 
reflects the positive skew of academic programs.  For more on this issue see Adams and Griliches (1998). 
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institutional affiliations on each paper, which is then summed over all papers.  The lower line consists of 
top 110 paper equivalents. This is the fraction of top 110 affiliations in all affiliations summed over papers.  
U.S. and top 110 equivalent papers grow more slowly than total papers.  Top 110 equivalents decline by 
2.5% as of 1999 compared with the 1995 peak.  The increasing spread between papers and their U.S. 
equivalents reflects the rising contribution of foreign institutions.  This could be seen as beneficial: foreign 
institutions produce more of the research and transfer more of their knowledge to the U.S.  Or it could be 
viewed with pessimism: just remaining in the same place after 1995 seems to have required an increase in 
the foreign contribution.  
Figure 2 graphs domestic collaboration with other top 110 schools (left scale) and with the top 200 
U.S. R&D firms (right scale)
12.  While the per paper number of schools and firms grow at roughly the same 
rate, growth in collaboration with firms is less rapid in the 1980s and more rapid in the 1990s.  This 
acceleration in university-firm joint research could represent increasing placement of graduate students 
with firms rather than schools, it could be a statement about the success of federal programs designed to 
promote joint research, or it could signify a slowdown in industrial support for basic research that leads to 
increasing reliance on university collaborators.  This last point is consistent with the decline in scientific 
papers published in industry since 1991. See National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering 
Indicators 2004, Volume II, table 5-36. 
Comparative trends in foreign and total collaborations are the subject of figure 3.  Trends in foreign 
universities and institutions per paper follow the left scale.  The right scale indicates the total of all 
institutions.  Collaborations with foreign universities and institutions grow more rapidly than institutional 
collaboration as a whole, which is consistent with figure 1
13. 
Figure 4 reveals that growth rates in team size (authors per paper) and institutional collaborations are 
about the same.  Given that foreign collaborations are growing more rapidly than all collaborations, 
domestic collaborations must be growing more slowly than team size.  Thus, scientific teams are becoming 
more internationalized over time. 
                                                 
12 We define the number of other top 110 schools as the number of top 110 schools minus one, which 
represents the “home” institution. In this way we account for conditioning of the data on membership in the 
top 110 universities. 
13 Correcting the total for conditioning on a top 110 university, the total institutions series increases from 
0.8 to 2.0, or 2.5 times.  Foreign schools per paper increase from 0.07 to 0.32, or more than 4.5 times, while 
all foreign affiliations increase from 0.1 to 0.46, which is again more than 4.5 times. 
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The next two figures examine trends in foreign collaboration by region of the world from 1981 to 
1999
14.  Figure 5 reports counts of foreign addresses per paper. The dominant region for collaboration is 
Europe, reflecting the size of the scientific sector in Europe.  The countries of South and East Asia come in 
second by the end of the period, followed by the rest of the Americas. The rest of the world, composed of 
Africa, the Middle East, and Oceania, runs a distant fourth.    Figure 6 brings out more clearly the 
differences in growth by region.  The figure normalizes each of the series in figure 5 by its 1981 value. 
Growth is more rapid in Asia and Europe and slower in the Americas and the rest of the world. This reflects 
differences in the growth of scientific resources by region. 
Figures 7 and 8 consider interactions between team size and the foreign share.  Figure 7 displays time 
paths of the foreign share classified by intervals of team size.  The foreign share is greater in larger teams.  
International cost-sharing of large-scale projects could lie behind this relationship, for example in the 
Human Genome project, in large-scale space missions, and so on.  Figure 8 brings out comparative growth 
more clearly by again normalizing each of the series in figure 7 by its 1981 value.  The graph shows that 
smaller teams are becoming more internationalized at a faster rate.  Since larger teams are more 
internationalized in 1981, this implies convergence in the foreign share by team size.  
Figures 9 and 10 reveal comparative trends in the foreign share by science field.  Figure 9 reports time 
series of the foreign share in which fields are grouped by their initial 1981 share.  The three most 
international fields are astronomy, mathematics and statistics; and physics. The three fields that are least 
international are agriculture, biology, and medicine.  The foreign shares of remaining fields (chemistry, 
computer science, earth sciences, economics, engineering, and psychology) fall in the middle.  Figure 10 
brings out comparative growth more clearly by normalizing each of the series in figure 9 by the 1981 value.  
The figure shows that the life sciences are becoming internationalized at the most rapid rate. Since these 
fields are the least internationalized at the start, this result again suggests a mild form of convergence in the 
foreign shares.      
                                                 
14 In this figure Europe consists of Western and Eastern Europe as well as the European Soviet Socialist 
Republics of the former Soviet Union.  Asian countries include Japan, India, China, and other countries of 
East and South Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.  Other countries in 
the Americas include Canada, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.  Africa, the Middle 
East, and Oceania includes Israel (Middle East) and Australia and New Zealand (Oceania), and thus 
contains the developed countries in each region. 
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V.  Findings on Collaborative Behavior By Field of Science 
   We turn now to descriptive findings by field of science and time.  We display these in a series of 
tables given the number of fields which each chart involves.  Table 3 reports team size in 1981, 1990, and 
1999, as well as growth in team size across the decades of the 1980s and 1990s.  In 10 of 12 fields, growth 
occurs more rapidly in the 1990s.  This pattern dominates the grand average in the bottom row.  
Acceleration in the growth of team size is the rule in these data. 
  Table 4 uses a direct measure of distance to explore the geographic dispersion of team members. 
Owing to data limitations the analysis is restricted to the top 110 U.S. universities. We assume that the 
highest ranked university-field on each paper is the “head” institution and calculate mileages to other top 
110 institutions on that paper based on latitude and longitude coordinates
15.  If only one top 110 institution 
participates in a paper then the mileage is zero.  Therefore, changes in the mileage statistics depend on 
changes in the tendency to work with other top 110 schools. The average mileage on a paper is a direct 
measure of geographic dispersion within the system of top 110 schools. 
The table reports mean distances in 1981, 1990, and 1999 and it compares growth rates across 
decades.  Growth in geographic dispersion is quite clear but acceleration in growth is less obvious. Six of 
12 fields show evidence of acceleration (agriculture, chemistry, earth sciences, engineering, physics, and 
psychology), the growth of one (biology) is constant, and the remaining five (astronomy, computer science, 
economics and business, mathematics and statistics, and medicine) reveal mild deceleration.  And yet the 
overall pattern is one of growth acceleration. Table 3 reveals an expanding geographic scope of 
collaboration within the top 110: mean distances double from 78 miles to 159 miles over the period.  And 
despite some mixed results, overall growth accelerates across the two decades.  On average the rate of 
growth in mileage increases from 3.5% in the 1980s to 4.5% in the 1990s.  
  Table 5 considers domestic institutional collaboration by field.  The table is specifically concerned 
with collaborations with other top 110 schools and with top 200 R&D firms.  The table reports levels of 
collaboration of both kinds in 1981 and 1999 and reports growth over the full period.   The table reveals 
changes in collaboration within academia as well as between academia and industry.  Growth in 
                                                 
15 The calculation assumes that the earth is a sphere and calculates distance using the geodesic or shortest 
distance between two points on that sphere.  For more, see Adams and Jaffe (1996) and Adams (2002). 
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collaboration within the university sector is general, although it is most rapid in agriculture, biology, 
chemistry, and psychology.  The situation is quite different in the “between” dimension. There 
heterogeneity is the norm: it is the life sciences (agriculture, biology, and medicine) and psychology whose 
collaboration with firms expands most rapidly.  Industry-university collaboration in more established 
industrial-scientific fields (chemistry, computer science, engineering, and physics) grows more slowly.  Of 
course, the level of collaboration is far higher in these fields than in the life and behavioral sciences.  
Astronomy and economics are the only fields where university-firm collaboration declines.  All these 
patterns are of course driven by changes in the population of industrial scientists in the different disciplines.  
  Table 5 allows us to compare growth rates in domestic collaboration across sectors and fields.  Let 
us define a relative increase in the “outward” dimension of a field as an excess in growth of collaboration 
with industry over growth in collaboration with universities.  Likewise, let us define a relative increase in 
the “inward” dimension as taking place when the growth rate with industry is less than the growth rate with 
universities.  Based on this criterion agriculture, biology, computer science, medicine, and psychology are 
becoming more outward disciplines. By the same token astronomy, chemistry, earth science, economics 
and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, and physics are becoming more inward.   
  Table 6 concludes the descriptive findings by examining trends in foreign collaboration across the 
sciences.  The table computes the foreign share in institutional addresses on individual papers in 1981, 
1990, and 1999.  It also examines growth in the share across the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. For 
comparison we include mean foreign and total institutional affiliations in brackets.  Almost without 
exception growth in the foreign share is more rapid than growth of either of the domestic indicators shown 
in table 4.  Moreover, growth accelerates in every field.   Average growth is 5.11% in the 1980s but 7.41% 
in the 1990s, so that the acceleration is 0.45 (7.41/5.11 - 1). 
VI.  Regression Findings 
We turn now to the problem of explaining team size, the various dimensions of institutional 
collaboration by sector and country, and research “output”.  For this purpose, as we have seen, we have 
constructed a panel of universities, fields and years, in order to match relevant data from the National 
Science Foundation and the National Research Council that are reported at this level, as we have already 
explained in section III of this paper.  Table 7 contains descriptive statistics from the panel data.  The 
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statistics show that the average university field-year observation has a team size of 4.26 authors per paper, 
of which 2.65 are estimated to belong to a university-field
16.  The average university-field article involves 
0.41 other top 110 universities. On average foreign institutions contribute a 5.2 percent share of all 
institutional affiliations, while U.S. firms contribute 2.0 percent.  The average number of papers is 149, for 
which 709 citations are received from other top 110 universities during the first five years including the 
year in which the paper is published. 
The average stock of deflated R&D is about 58 million dollars of 1992.  This is the eight-year stock 
depreciated at a 15% rate and lagged one year.  Thus the R&D stock in 1981 is the sum of deflated and 
depreciated R&D over the years 1973-1980 and likewise for all other years
17.  The average stock of R&D 
per lagged paper, a measure of resources per unit of “output”, is about a half million dollars of 1992.  
Private universities account for 35 percent of the sample, while on average there are 0.23 prestigious 
awards per university-field. 
The local university R&D ratio captures the geographic concentration of research in the vicinity of a 
university-field, which could be a measure of the ease of institutional collaboration.  It is defined as the 
ratio of other universities’ R&D within 25 miles to the same R&D within 200 miles.  Thus, it denotes the 
low cost of nearby collaborators.  The ratio of equipment expenditure to R&D over the previous three years 
could signify capital-labor substitution, as well as replacement of institutional collaborations. 
Ten percent of graduate students go to a school that ranks in the top 20 percent of the top 110 
universities.  Eighteen percent go to U.S. firms, and five percent go to 12 countries that are highly active in 
scientific research. These variables are pools of graduate students that could drive shares of other top 110 
schools, U.S. firms, and foreign institutions in the research of a given university-field.  In the empirical 
work we lag the different graduate student shares by two years in order to take publication lags into 
account.   
                                                 
16 The average number of authors is greater in the panel data consisting of university-fields than in the 
original paper level data, because the university-field observations weight large teams more heavily than do 
individual papers.   
17 The choice of an eight-year (and thus incomplete) R&D stock is dictated by the 1973 start date for flows 
of R&D in the CASPAR data base, as this interacts with the 1981 start date of the ISI data.  The eight-year 
stock is thus the longest history that we have.  We should say that the CASPAR R&D data, while they 
represent a major achievement in data collection on universities, also contain substantial respondent errors.  
We have tried to flag these errors and to remove all suspicious observations on R&D from our analysis.  
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Table 8 reports regressions that explain the measure of team size, the logarithm of authors per paper.  
Since authors per paper are university-field means, the data are continuous and the estimation method is 
OLS.  All the regressions remove bad or missing data on the R&D stocks.  All include dummy variables for 
year and field, in which 1981 and chemistry are the omitted categories.  The dummies absorb trend and 
field effects, which are highly significant and similar to those depicted in the preceding figures.   
Equation 8.1 is a baseline regression that includes the logarithm of the stock of federally funded R&D 
in thousands of 1992 dollars and the private university indicator.  We find that the stock of federally funded 
R&D per paper to an extent increases team size
18.  This suggests that larger projects entail greater 
specialization.  Private universities form significantly larger teams.  There are several possible explanations 
for this result.  Private universities may obtain more R&D funding from private foundations and wealthy 
donors, which we are not able to measure.  Another possible reason for the finding is that better pay, start-
up packages, and working conditions in top private institutions attract more talented faculty (Ehrenberg, 
2003; Ehrenberg, Rizzo, and Jakubson, forthcoming). This talent advantage, which is related to salary and 
perhaps governance advantages of top private institutions, could pull together a larger pool of coworkers 
(Zuckerman and Merton, 1973). 
Equation 8.2 repeats 8.1 but restricts team size to less than 10 workers.  The idea behind this restriction 
is that university-field R&D is increasingly mismatched with team size as size increases, because an 
escalating share of funding is external and is not captured by university-field R&D.  Thus, the error in the 
R&D stock rises with team size.  Consistent with this idea, the coefficient on R&D stock increases slightly 
and is more significant in 8.2 than 8.1.   
Equations 8.3 and 8.4 add a battery of variables to 8.1 and 8.2. As a whole these variables reduce the 
regression coefficient of the stock of R&D per paper. The battery includes the number of prestigious 
awards.  Since awards data are missing for agriculture and medicine, 8.3 and 8.4 exclude these two fields.  
Awards increase team size, consistent with the notion that funding and talent attract coworkers.  The local 
R&D ratio, which tries to capture local concentration of potential team members, has a small positive effect 
on team size, which is not always significant, perhaps because team workers in the same school substitute 
for team workers elsewhere.  The equipment intensity of R&D spending in the most recent three years 
                                                 
18 We divide federally funded R&D by papers lagged two years, in order to avoid division error bias with 
the logarithm of authors per paper on the left hand side of the regression. 
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could signify capital- labor substitution.  Consistent with this, its coefficient is negative, but again it is not 
always significant.  Finally, the indicator of top 20 percent in field slightly decreases team size, possibly 
indicating the availability of graduate student assistance within an institution. 
Table 9 consists of Grouped Logit equations. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the relative 
share of other top 110 schools in the research of a given university-field. This is the share divided by one 
minus the share
19.  While the relative share seems to be a useful way to get at substitution of research by 
other top 110 schools for internal research, it does have one limitation.  Observations for which the relative 
share equals zero cannot be included in the estimation procedure, because these zero values rule out any 
finite value for the regression function.  The same point applies to tables 10 and 11, which also use 
Grouped Logit. 
All equations in table 9 include year and field dummies, which are highly significant.  In equations 9.1 
and 9.3 the logarithm of the stock of federally funded R&D per paper significantly increases the share of 
other top 110 schools. Private universities collaborate to a larger extent with other top 110 schools, as do 
schools where the faculty have earned a larger number of awards.  Again we attribute the greater reach of 
institutions with more research dollars and more awards to greater resources and talent. 
Equations 9.2 and 9.4 include an array of new variables. The fraction of former PhD students placed in 
the top 40 percent of schools in a field is a significant factor in collaboration.  Again top 20 percent status 
in a field deters collaborations with other top 110 schools, perhaps because of the availability of graduate 
assistance within a university-field. 
Table 10 is similar to table 9, except that here the dependent variable is the relative share of foreign 
institutions in the research of a university-field.  For this reason the PhD placement indicator is the fraction 
of PhDs who have located to top research countries.  The role of the university-field R&D stock per paper 
is not as strong in table 10 as it was before in table 9, perhaps because the availability of foreign R&D in 
part drives the collaboration.  And yet additional R&D and private control do increase the foreign share in 
10.1 and 10.2. 
The foreign placement indicator contributes strongly to foreign collaboration.  It is of some interest to 
note that the share of equipment expenditures in the recent past significantly discourages foreign 
                                                 
19 Grouped Logit writes the regression function as ( ) [ ] u X s s + ′ = − β 1 / log . 
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collaboration.  This result suggests the role of the funding motive (see section II) for foreign and other 
collaborations, especially in equipment-intensive fields such as astronomy and experimental physics, which 
are well represented in these data (see figures 9 and 10 and table 6).  Foreign collaborations could amortize 
fixed costs of expensive equipment across countries in such fields. 
Table 11 repeats the exercise of tables 9 and 10, this time using the logarithm of the relative U.S. 
corporate share in the research of a university-field as the dependent variable.  While the stock of R&D per 
paper has rather weak effects on the corporate share, private control of a university increases U.S. corporate 
collaboration at a high level of statistical significance.  In contrast university-fields that have earned many 
prestigious awards collaborate less with firms.  What these results suggest to us is that corporate R&D 
support is much sought after by private universities.  This is true, except in the case of departments with a 
strong basic science focus that tend to win prestigious awards and extensive federal support. Notice that 
because firms are the primary supporters of research collaborations with universities, it is their R&D that is 
the likely driver of collaboration, not the university-field’s R&D. 
Also in table 11, the fraction of former PhDs placed in industry strongly drives collaboration with 
firms, as one would expect. Recent equipment-intensity also appears to substitute for firm collaborations, 
again suggesting the role of outside research partners in underwriting equipment expense. 
Tables 8-11 hold constant science field, R&D stock, private control, PhD placements, equipment 
intensity of R&D, as well as other variables.  For this reason time effects from the regression tables should 
lie closer to “pure” effects of technological change on collaboration than trends in the raw data.  To show 
what these effects look like, figure 11 graphs the regression coefficients from the time dummies in 
equations 8.1, 9.1, 10.1, and 11.1, which we previously suppressed in the interest of brevity.  A comparison 
of the various line graphs confirms what we have already seen—that the foreign share increases more 
rapidly than the other indicators, and so on.  However, there is an interesting jump in the time series of 
relative shares contributed by foreign institutions, U.S. universities, and U.S. firms, which occurs between 
1990 and 1991.  This jump likely applies to papers written in the late 1980s.  Our guess is that the jump 
measures the increasing availability of information technology, which enables team workers to collaborate 
more cheaply and effectively at a distance.  This seems especially reasonable given that there is no clear 
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jump in team size at this time, so that external coworkers are replacing internal coworkers.  We concede 
that this point is somewhat speculative and that more work is needed to prove the claim.              
The empirical work concludes with Table 12, which is concerned with the explanation of research 
“output” measured by the sum of fractions of papers and citations to those papers by a university-field
20.  
The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares.  As before, year and field dummies are included 
throughout the table.  Equations 12.1 to 12.3 use the logarithm of the fractional number of papers as the 
dependent variable, while 12.4 to 12.6 use the logarithm of fractional five-year citations.  By “fractional” of 
course, we mean the sum of the internal paper and citation fractions within a university-field 
In equation 12.1 and the others the coefficient of the logarithm of the lagged stock of R&D is as 
expected, positive and highly significant.  However, it is also significantly less than 1.0, consistent with the 
findings of Adams and Griliches (1998) that suggest diminishing returns to the stock of R&D at the 
university-field level.  The logarithm of all authors per paper decreases the output of papers in 12.1.  
However, this anomalous result merely picks up movement of authorship outside the university-field.  The 
negative sign is spurious: larger teams involve more institutional collaboration, a smaller number of inside 
authors, and thus a smaller number of internal, fractional papers.  To see this more clearly notice that when 
the fractional number of authors inside a university-field is used instead, as in 12.2, the coefficient on the 
logarithm of authors reverses and becomes positive and highly significant.  This is precisely the pattern of 
sign that one would expect of indicators of the division of labor such as team size. 
Equation 12.3 adds shares of other U.S. universities foreign institutions, and U.S. firms to 12.1. 
Shares of outside institutions reduce the fractional number of papers, in part because, as already noted, 
authorship moves away from the university-field.  Another possibility, which is raised by the citation 
results, is that a quantity-quality tradeoff exists in the data.  An increase in the foreign share may genuinely 
imply that fewer but better papers are written within a university-field. 
If equations 12.1 to 12.3 seem to suggest that collaboration reduces the number of papers for 
reasons that are mostly spurious, then 12.4 to 12.6 indicate that institutional collaboration increases citation 
and thus total scientific impact.  However, the counterpart to the spurious negative effect of all team 
                                                 
20 Recall that if a university-field contributes half a paper, the fraction assigned is ½; if it contributes a 
third, then the fraction is 1/3, and so forth. See fn. 7.  For present purposes this fractionation of papers and 
citations avoids multiple counting of the papers and citations across universities.   
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members on papers in 12.1, is the much smaller output elasticity of all authors in 12.4 compared with that 
of “inside” authors in 12.5.  In 12.6 we see that that institutional collaboration also increases fractional 
citations.  Overall, the evidence of table 12 suggests that the scientific division of labor increases research 
“output” as measured by total influence of a university-field
21.    
VII.  Discussion and Conclusion         
This paper has presented evidence on patterns of research collaboration in U.S. universities over the 
last two decades of the 20
th century.  The evidence on the size of scientific teams, as measured by authors 
per paper, suggests that specialization and the division of labor have increased markedly over this period, 
especially during the 1990s.  Our findings on collaboration between institutions suggest a similar pattern of 
developments, but with some new twists.  Collaboration with foreign universities increases more rapidly 
over time than team size, while domestic collaboration increases less rapidly.  We take this as evidence that 
the location of team members is shifting and is becoming more geographically dispersed.  However, we 
lack complete information on the causal factors directing this dispersion.  It seems plausible to say that 
domestic collaboration has for a long time been more feasible than international collaboration, and that 
only recently have modern communications technologies made international science viable for researchers 
on projects of normal size.  This interpretation receives support from figures 7 and 8 where it is the smaller 
teams that are becoming internationalized at a faster rate.  But in addition, an increasing emphasis on large 
databases, as in biology and medicine, and on massive instrumentation, as in astronomy and physics, may 
have also played important roles in these trends towards greater internationalization.   
The growth of collaboration as observed in this article could be viewed as consistent with the 
increasing efficiency of the research enterprise.  Collaboration at a distance permits a combination of 
complementary capabilities that leads to the execution of more and hopefully better research.  In this way it 
is likely welfare-improving. However, a more somber interpretation is that lagging public funding of 
scientific research compels universities to engage in institutional collaborations, especially with firms and 
foreign institutions, as a substitute means of support.  
                                                 
21 This is not a perfect test.  Some citations could involve hidden self-citations to previous collaborations by 
the same research team.  We cannot address this upward bias with the data that we have, because we cannot 
link names and addresses of researchers, including across papers. 
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Appendix 
The 110 Top Universities 
  
 
Appendix Table A-1 
The Top 110 U.S. Universities in the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Database 
Ranked By 1998 Federal R&D 
 
University Name (Rank) 
 
1998 Federal 
R & D 
Expenditures 
 
University Name (Rank) 
 
1998 Federal 
R & D 
Expenditures 
 
Johns Hopkins University (1)  752.983*  Emory University (36)  118.045 
Stanford University (2)  342.426  University of Iowa (37)  115.312 
University of Washington – Seattle (3)  336.748  University of California-Davis (38)  114.912 
University of Michigan, All Campuses (4)  311.450  Georgia Institute of Technology, All Campuses (39)  113.643 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (5)  310.741  Baylor College of Medicine (40)  110.610 
University of California-San Diego (6)  262.303  University of Florida (41)  106.510 
Harvard University (7)  251.876  Vanderbilt University (42)  106.325 
University of Pennsylvania (8)  247.914  Boston University (43)  104.428 
University of Wisconsin-Madison (9)  240.513  University of Miami (44)  101.492 
University of California-Los Angeles (10)  233.702  New York University (45)  101.426 
Columbia University, All Campuses (11)  229.723  University of Utah (46)  100.722 
University of Colorado, All Campuses (12)  228.342  University of Massachusetts, All Campuses (47)  100.122 
University of California-San Francisco (13)  219.912  University of Texas Southwestern Med Center Dallas (48)  97.200 
University of Alabama, All Campuses (14)  205.511  Indiana University, All Campuses (49)  95.840 
Yale University (15)  205.046  Carnegie Mellon University (50)  95.046 
University of Minnesota, All Campuses (16)  204.741  University of Virginia, All Campuses (51)  93.328 
Cornell University, All Campuses (17)  204.187  Purdue University, All Campuses (52)  92.844 
University of Southern California (18)  190.547  SUNY at Stony Brook, All Campuses (53)  91.531 
Washington University (19)  187.173  University of Cincinnati, All Campuses (54)  90.307 
Pennsylvania State University, All Campuses (20)  186.274  University of Hawaii at Manoa (55)  86.886 
California Institute of Technology (21)  177.748 Georgetown  University (56)  84.801 
Duke University (22)  172.532  University of New Mexico, All Campuses (57)  84.365 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (23)  171.505  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (58)  82.734 
University of California-Berkeley (24)  171.135  Oregon State University (59)  82.416 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (25) 168.871  Michigan  State  University (60)  81.146 
University of Pittsburgh, All Campuses (26) 168.511  Colorado  State  University (61)  80.451 
University of Texas at Austin (27)  165.082  Yeshiva University (62)  80.000 
University of Arizona (28)  161.999  North Carolina State University at Raleigh (63)  79.533 
Texas A&M University, All Campuses (29)  144.938  University of Maryland at Baltimore (64)  78.037 
Case Western Reserve University (30)  132.274  SUNY at Buffalo, All Campuses (65)  76.037 
University of Rochester (31)  130.773  University of Illinois at Chicago (66)  73.797 
University of Maryland at College Park (32)  129.198  Oregon Health Sciences University (67)  71.054 
Northwestern University (33)  127.911  University of Texas Health Science Center Houston (68)  70.446 
University of Chicago (34)  125.982  Rutgers the State University of NJ, All Campuses (69)  69.829 
Ohio State University, All Campuses (35)  124.177  University of Tennessee, All Campuses (70)  69.793 
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Appendix Table A-1 
The Top 110 U.S. Universities in the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Database 
Ranked By 1998 Federal R&D 
 
University Name (Rank) 
 
1998 Federal 
R & D 
Expenditures 
 
University Name (Rank) 
 
1998 Federal 
R & D 
Expenditures 
 
Princeton University (71)  69.005  Louisiana State University, All Campuses (91)  67.090 
University of California-Santa Barbara (72)  68.408  University of California-Irvine (92)  65.902 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (73)  64.765 Washington  State  University (93)  44.510 
University of Missouri, All Campuses (74)  63.556  Brown University (94)  44.412 
Tufts University (75)  61.167  Rockefeller University (95)  43.845 
University of Kentucky, All Campuses (76)  60.760  Arizona State University Main (96)  41.359 
University of Nebraska, All Campuses (77)  58.482  Rice University (97)  34.772 
Wayne State University (78)  57.646  University of Delaware (98)  33.688 
Wake Forest University (79)  56.705  CUNY, All Campuses (99)  32.412 
New Mexico State University, All Campuses (80)  56.587  University of AK Fairbanks, All Campuses (100)  31.505 
University of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio (81)  55.004  University of Vermont (101)  31.460 
Utah State University (82)  54.903  University of California-Santa Cruz (102)  29.849 
University of Georgia (83)  54.712  Syracuse University, All Campuses (103)  29.200 
University of Connecticut, All Campuses (84)  53.189  Brandeis University (104)  28.098 
Tulane University (85)  52.924  University of Oregon (105)  27.041 
Iowa State University (86)  51.196  University of New Hampshire (106)  25.913 
University of Kansas, All Campuses (87)  50.567  West Virginia University (107)  24.985 
Florida State University (88)  50.451  University of California-Riverside (108)  22.988 
Virginia Commonwealth University (89)  48.167  Loyola University of Chicago (109)  17.685 
Dartmouth College (90)  45.053  Lehigh University (110)  13.019 
Notes.  Federal R&D is taken from the CASPAR database of the National Science Foundation.  * The data 
for Johns Hopkins University includes R&D expense for the Applied Physics Laboratory.  
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Figure 5--Foreign Address Counts per Paper,
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Figure 6--Normalized Foreign Address Counts per Paper,
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Figure 7--Foreign Address Share per Paper,
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Figure 8--Normalized Foreign Address Share per Paper,
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Figure 9--Foreign Address Share per Paper,
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Figure 11--Trends in Team Size and Institutional Collaborations,
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Table 1 
Composition of 12 Main Science Fields, 
Papers and Citations of the Top 110 U.S. Universities 
 
 
Main Science Field 
 






General agriculture and agronomy; aquatic sciences; animal sciences; plant sciences; agricultural 





Astronomy and astrophysics 
Biology 
 
General biological sciences; biochemistry and biophysics; cell and developmental biology; ecology 
and environment; molecular biology and genetics; biotechnology and applied microbiology; 
microbiology; experimental biology; immunology; neurosciences and behavior; pharmacology and 




General chemistry; analytical chemistry; inorganic and nuclear chemistry; organic chemistry and 









Atmospheric sciences; geology and other earth sciences; geological, petroleum, and mining 
engineering; oceanography 
  
Economics and Business 
 







Aeronautical engineering; biomedical engineering; chemical engineering; civil engineering; 
electrical and electronics engineering; engineering mathematics; environmental engineering and 
energy; industrial engineering; materials science; mechanical engineering; metallurgy; nuclear 
engineering 
 
Mathematics and Statistics 
 
Mathematics; biostatistics and statistics 
Medicine 
 
General and internal medicine; anesthesia and intensive care; cardiovascular and hematology 
research; cardiovascular and respiratory systems; clinical immunology and infectious disease; 
clinical psychology and psychiatry; dentistry and oral surgery; dermatology; endocrinology, 
metabolism, and nutrition; environmental medicine and public health; gastroenterology and 
hepatology; health care sciences and services; hematology; medical research, diagnosis, and 
treatment; medical research, general topics; medical research, organs and systems; neurology; 
oncology; ophthalmology; orthopedics, rehabilitation, and sports medicine; otolaryngology; 
pediatrics; radiology, nuclear medicine, and imaging; reproductive medicine; research, laboratory 




General physics; applied physics, condensed matter, and materials science; optics and acoustics 
 
Psychology Psychology  and  psychiatry 
 
Source: Institute for Scientific Information   
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Table 2 
Distribution of Papers by Field, of the Top 110 U.S. Universities 
1981, 1990, 1999, and All Years 
 
 
Number of Papers 
 
 
Field of Science 
   
1981 
 
1990 1999  All  Years 























































































































       
Total 96,966  126,274  152,454  2,409,529 
       









Team Size and Its Rate of Growth, by Field, of the Top 110 U.S. Universities 
1981, 1990, and 1999 
 
 























          
Agriculture  2.407 
 
1.55  2.768 
 
2.00  3.314 
 
Astronomy  2.654 
 
2.36  3.283 
 
4.57  4.952 
 
Biology  2.810 
 
2.11  3.398 
 
2.55  4.274 
 
Chemistry  2.816 
 
1.04  3.093 
 
1.68  3.597 
 
Computer Science  1.861 
 
1.47  2.124 
 
2.42  2.640 
 
Earth Sciences  2.288  2.30  2.814 
 
2.78  3.615 
Economics  1.572 
 
1.04  1.727 
 
1.29  1.939 
 
Engineering  2.289 
 
1.14  2.537 
 
1.80  2.984 
 
Mathematics  1.531 
 
0.97  1.671 
 
1.47  1.907 
 
Medicine  3.259 
 
1.79  3.828 
 
1.99  4.580 
 
Physics  3.091 
 
5.46  5.053 
 
4.03  7.264 
 
Psychology  2.209 
 
1.66  2.565 
 
2.24  3.138 
 
          
Total 2.766  2.19  3.368  2.57  4.244 
          
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4 
Distance Between Team Workers in the Top 110 U.S. Universities, 
By Field, 1981, 1990, and 1999 
 
 























          
Agriculture  50.9 
 
2.63  64.5 
 
7.15  122.8 
 
Astronomy  264.6 
 
2.76  339.2 
 
1.82  399.5 
 
Biology  76.8 
 
4.45  114.6 
 
4.46  171.2 
 
Chemistry  50.8 
 
0.58  53.5 
 
4.65  81.3 
 
Computer Science  138.2 
 
0.45  143.9 
 
0.12  145.4 
 
Earth Sciences  145.7 
 
2.29  179.1  5.95  306.0 
Economics  124.8 
 
4.28  183.5 
 
0.81  197.3 
 
Engineering  61.2  1.76  71.7  2.94  93.4 
 
Mathematics  128.3 
 
1.68  149.2 
 
1.50  170.8 
 
Medicine  62.2 
 
5.34  100.6 
 
4.84  155.5 
 
Physics  92.6 
 
2.51  116.1 
 
3.40  157.7 
 
Psychology  88.8 
 
4.18  129.4 
 
4.55  194.8 
 
          
Total 77.7  3.53  106.8  4.45  159.4 
          
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations. 
 




Indicators of U.S. Institutional Collaboration, 
By Field, Paper of the Top 110 Universities, 1981 and 1999 
 
 
Other Top 110 Universities Per Paper* 
 
 
Top 200 Firms Per Paper 
 
 



















           
Agriculture  0.224 
 
5.44  0.630 0.003  8.11  0.014 
Astronomy  0.387 
 
2.72  0.649 0.016  -0.34  0.015 
Biology  0.403 
 
5.45  1.135 0.007  6.03  0.022 
Chemistry  0.195 
 
7.50  0.811 0.023  2.78  0.039 
Computer Science  0.197 
 
2.55  0.320 0.078  4.25  0.175 
Earth Sciences  0.250 
 
3.71  0.506 0.021  0.24  0.022 
Economics  0.177 
 
3.47  0.342 0.009  -3.09  0.005 
Engineering  0.175 
 
4.73  0.430 0.046  2.91  0.080 
Mathematics  0.166 
 
3.11  0.300 0.012  2.69  0.020 
Medicine  0.500 
 
3.67  1.005 0.005  8.26  0.024 
Physics  0.280 
 
3.98  0.596 0.048  0.11  0.049 
Psychology  0.214 
 
5.34  0.590 0.002  6.59  0.007 
           
Total 0.345  4.70  0.843 0.014  4.18  0.031 
           
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations. *This is the number of top 110 
universities per paper minus one.  This measure maintains symmetry with top 200 firms per paper, which is 
the number of “other” institutions as well, in this case, top R&D firms. 
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Table 6 
Measures of Foreign Affiliation, by Field 
Papers of the Top 110 Universities, 1981, 1990, and 1999 
 
Mean Share of Foreign Affiliations 




Field of Science 































4.77  0.043 
[0.113,1.638] 
 







5.49  0.141 
[0.509,2.479] 
 







6.31  0.060 
[0.189,2.046] 
 







3.14  0.061 
[0.161,1.573] 
 







3.70  0.060 
[0.151,1.680] 
 







5.33  0.084 
[0.267,1.950] 
 







3.06  0.054 
[0.130,1.634] 
 







3.13  0.053 
[0.131,1.574] 
 







4.45  0.106 
[0.248,1.588] 
 







6.29  0.037 
[0.132,2.265] 
 







3.74  0.098 
[0.456,2.169] 
 







6.22  0.028 
[0.075,1.775] 
 
8.28  0.059 
[0.188,2.329] 
 
Total  0.036 
[0.097,1.731] 
5.11  0.057 
[0.186,1.971] 
7.41  0.111 
[0.466,2.840] 
          
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Principal Regression Variables 








Indicators of Teamwork and Research “Output”  
   
Number of Authors in a University-Field per Paper  2.65 
(0.96) 
Number of Authors per Paper  4.26 
(6.43) 




Foreign Share per Paper   0.07 
(0.05) 








Number of Citations Received by a University-Field, 
This Year and the Next Four Years 
708.75 
(1575.74) 
   
Characteristics of University-Fields 
   
Stock of Federally Funded R&D in a University and Field 
(in Thousands of 1992 Dollars) 
58,277.65 
(81,955.07) 
Stock of Federally Funded R&D in a University and Field 
Per Paper (in Thousands of 1992 Dollars) 
485.71 
(746.57) 
Private University  0.35 
(0.48) 
Number of Awards 
a 0.23 
(0.62) 






Previous Three Years 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Share of Graduate Students Placed in Top 20 Percent 
Schools, lagged two Years  
0.10 
(0.14) 




Share of Graduate Students Placed in 12 Top Research 





Notes:  Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, 
National Research Council, and authors’ calculations.   
a Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur 
Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the National 
Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for a further discussion. 
b The Local University 
R&D Ratio equals R&D in the same field but in other universities within 25 miles, divided by R&D in the 
same field but in other universities within 200 miles.  
c Research countries are Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. 






Determinants of Team Size 
Dependent Variable: Log (Authors/Paper) 
(T-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 





















Restrictions on Team Size 
 
None Less  than  10 
Workers 
None Less  than  10 
Workers 
Fields Included  All 12 Main 
Fields 
All 12 Main 
Fields 
10 Fields 
a 10 Fields 
a





















Log (Stock of Federally Funded R & D, 



















Number of Awards 
a 
 









Previous Three Years 




Top 20 Percent In Field 
(1=yes, 0=No) 










0.76 0.81 0.76 0.78 
Number of Observations 
 
9,638 9,228 7,371 6,979 
Notes:  Estimation Method is OLS.  Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, the 
National Science Foundation, the National Research Council, and authors’ calculations. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the mean number of authors per paper in a university, field, and year.  
a 
Agriculture and Medicine lack data on prizes and awards   
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur 
Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the National 
Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for a further discussion.  
c The Local University 
R&D Ratio equals R&D in the same field but in other universities within 25 miles, divided by R&D in the 
same field but in other universities within 200 miles.  **Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level for a one-tailed test.  * Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-
tailed test.   
 




Determinants of Relative Contribution of U.S. Universities 
Dependent Variable: Log (Other Top 110 Share/(1-Other Top 110 Share)) 
(T-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 





















Fields Included  All 12 Main 
Fields 
All 12 Main 
Fields 
10 Fields 
a 10 Fields 
a





















Log (Stock of Federal Funded R & D, 



















Number of Awards 
b 
 




Fraction of PhDs Placed In Top 40 Percent 


















Top 20 Percent in Field 











0.57 0.57 0.60 0.61 
Number of Observations 
 
9,613 8,621 7,726 7,182 
Notes:  Estimation method is Grouped Logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific 
Information, National Science Foundation, National Research Council, and authors’ calculations.  
a Data on prizes and awards are missing for agriculture and medicine.  
b Awards include the Fields Medal, 
MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the 
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for further discussion.  
c The Local 
University R&D Ratio equals R&D in the same field but in other universities within 25 miles, divided by 
R&D in the same field but in other universities within 200 miles.  **Parameter is significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.  * Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level for a one-tailed test.   




Determinants of the Relative Foreign Contribution 
Dependent Variable: Log (Foreign Share /(1- Foreign Share)) 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 





















Fields Included  All 12 Main 
Fields 
All 12 Main 
Fields  
10 Fields 
a 10 Fields 
a





















Log (Stock of Federally Funded R & D 



















Number of Awards 
b
 




Fraction of PhDs Placed In the Top 12 
c 











Top 20 Percent in Field 











0.72 0.73  0.67 0.67 
Number of Observations 
 
9,509 9,169  7,629 7,461 
Notes:  Estimation method is Grouped Logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific 
Information, National Science Foundation, National Research Council, and authors’ calculations. 
a Agriculture and Medicine lack data on prizes and awards   
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur 
Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the National 
Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for a further discussion.  
c The top 12 research 
countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  See the text for further details.  **Parameter is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.  * Parameter is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.   
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Table 11 
Determinants of the Relative U.S. Corporate Contribution 
Dependent Variable: Log (U.S. Corporate Share/(1-U.S. Corporate Share)) 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 





















Fields Included  All 12 Main 
Fields 
All 12 Main 
Fields  
10 Fields 
a   10 Fields 
a





















Log (Stock of Federally Funded R & D 



















Number of Awards 
b
 




Fraction of PhDs Placed In U.S. 











Top 20 Percent in Field 











0.69 0.70  0.63 0.64 
Number of Observations 
 
8,378 8,103  6,597 6,472 
Notes:  Estimation method is Grouped Logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific 
Information, National Science Foundation, National Research Council, and authors’ calculations. 
a Agriculture and Medicine lack data on prizes and awards   
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur 
Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the National 
Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for a further discussion.  **Parameter is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.  * Parameter is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.   




Determinants of Research “Output” 
Dependent Variables: Log (Papers), Log (Citations over Five Years) 






Log (Citations over Five Years) 
 





























































































Log (University-Field Authors per Paper)    0.286 
(9.0)** 
   0.548 
(10.8)** 
 
Top 110 U.S. University Share per Paper 
 
   -5.973 
(-30.1)** 
   1.276 
(4.0)** 
Foreign Share per Paper       -1.059 
(-7.6)** 
   1.237 
(5.2)** 
U.S. Corporate Share Per Paper 
 
   -.378 
(-1.4) 








0.80 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Number of Observations 
 
10,772 10,772 10,772  8,504  8,504  8,504 
Notes:  Estimation method is OLS. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, 
National Science Foundation, National Research Council, and authors’ calculations. 
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal 
of Technology, Fellow of the National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize.  See the text for a further 
discussion.  **Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.  * 
Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test. 
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